Chat Wednesday 9 PM - 11 PM Eastern Time
- Go to www.fearofflying.com/chat.shtml
- See a recent chat transcript (names changed to protect privacy)
Free Group Phone Counseling With Capt Tom Wednesday 10 PM - 11 PM Eastern Time
- dial (712) 432-3900
- when asked to enter the conference ID 9352101 followed by the # sign
Note: if you have trouble getting in, try using a cellphone or a different regular phone.
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New York SOAR-Fest October 4th
Please see details at the end of this email.
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Seattle Washington SOAR-Fest October 4th
Please see details at the end of this email.
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Cause Of The Crash In Madrid
It has been announced that the flaps were not set for takeoff on the plane that crashed in Madrid August 20th.
First, let's understand what flaps do. The wing is designed for high speed flight. It does not have enough
size or curvature to fly slow enough to takeoff at a practical speed. Flaps, by extending outward from the front of the wing and from the rear of the wing, make the wing bigger. They also angle downward, to increase the curvature of the wing. By making the wing bigger and more curved, the wing is able to provide the necessary lift to hold the plane in the air at lower speeds.
Second, how are the flaps extended? A lever in the cockpit is used to position the flaps. The best comparison is to think of the shift lever on a car. You can position the shift lever on an automatic to park, reverse, neutral, drive, or lower speeds. When you position the shift lever, it latches into that position and stays there. So does the flap lever.
Third, what does the crew do? During taxi, the flap lever is moved to the takeoff flap position. Then, the crew waits until the flaps move to the takeoff position, and check that the flaps are in the proper position using the instruments that indicate the actual position. After making the plane ready for takeoff by memory, the checklist is read, and each item is confirmed to be set for takeoff.
For the flaps to not be properly positioned for takeoff means the crew not only did not position the flaps by memory, but they simply did not do the checklist.
Fourth, there is a warning system to alert the crew if takeoff is initiated and the flaps are not in the proper position. The system did not work. There is a history here that you may find of interest.
The first flap position warning system on jetliners was simply a microswitch which was switched to the "on" position when the throttles where moved forward to the position that produces takeoff power. This was a very simple system. It is just like when you move the brake pedal forward when using the brakes in your car; the tail lights go on. When the throttle is moved forward, the switch is turned on to send an electrical system to other switches which confirm the flaps are in the takeoff position. If the flaps are not in the takeoff position, an alarm goes off.
This system was simple and seemingly reliable. Also, it could easily be tested. Before starting the engines, with the flaps not extended, the pilots simply moved the throttles forward. The alarm went off proving the warning system to be working.
But there was a problem. A 707 cargo plane was talking off from an airport in Alaska. This was, of course, years ago when 707s were fairly new. The pilots elected to delay extending the wing flaps during taxi out due to snow falling. Then, when cleared for takeoff, they forgot about the flaps and tried to takeoff. The warning system did not work. Why? Because extremely cold Alaskan weather had made the air dense enough that the engines reached takeoff power with considerably less throttle movement. The switch did not get activated.
As is always the case in aviation, when there is an accident, there is a fix for the problem. The fix was to trigger the flap warning system - not by the throttles - but by the thrust gauge. This, being an instrument, required some complex wiring and computer systems. So far so good.
On Boeing aircraft, the new system could not be tested before each flight by the pilots. Instead, it was tested periodically by maintenance.
On Douglas planes, the system could be checked before every flight by the pilots. Fast forward to the 1987 crash in Detroit. The more sophisticated Douglas system warned about a number of things, and sometimes produced nuisance warnings. According to Captain Steve (who you may know from the message board or
the chat), it is believed that the pilots deactivated the
warning system due to nuisance warnings. They forgot to set the flaps for takeoff, and the system which would have picked up their failure gave them no warning.
The ironic thing is, the fix for the accident in Alaska - a more sophisticated system subject to nuisance false warnings - led to the accident in Detroit.
As a result of the Detroit accident with the Douglas plane, Boeing redesigned its system to allow the crew to check the warning system prior to every flight.
But we now learn, if the information is reliable, that it was Spainair's policy to check the warning system at the beginning of the day. Once it checked OK, it did not need, they thought, to be rechecked.
But look at the flaw in this reasoning. The warning system was, we assume, checked by the crew. They took the plane out to the runway for takeoff, but did not takeoff due to an air temperature probe overheat warning. The temperature probe, which is exposed to very low temperatures during flight, is heated to prevent icing. An electrical relay is supposed to keep probe heat off on the ground and turn probe heat on when the plane leaves the runway. The overheat warning suggests that the relay was malfunctioning. This particular temperature probe is a "nice to have" item, and is not required for flight. Thus, mechanics disconnected electrical power to the relay. It is possible that while doing this work, power to the flap warning system was disconnected. Or, it is possible that the warning system just picked that time to develop a problem.
Any way you figure it, the warning system needed to be checked before every flight, not just at the beginning of the day, and certainly after any maintenance. Why that was Spainair's policy, I don't know; that was not the policy at the airlines I worked for.
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Cause Of The Crash In Madrid
It has been announced that the flaps were not set for takeoff on the plane that crashed in Madrid August 20th.
First, let's understand what flaps do. The wing is designed for high speed flight. It does not have enough
size or curvature to fly slow enough to takeoff at a practical speed. Flaps, by extending outward from the front of the wing and from the rear of the wing, make the wing bigger. They also angle downward, to increase the curvature of the wing. By making the wing bigger and more curved, the wing is able to provide the necessary lift to hold the plane in the air at lower speeds.
Second, how are the flaps extended? A lever in the cockpit is used to position the flaps. The best comparison is to think of the shift lever on a car. You can position the shift lever on an automatic to park, reverse, neutral, drive, or lower speeds. When you position the shift lever, it latches into that position and stays there. So does the flap lever.
Third, what does the crew do? During taxi, the flap lever is moved to the takeoff flap position. Then, the crew waits until the flaps move to the takeoff position, and check that the flaps are in the proper position using the instruments that indicate the actual position. After making the plane ready for takeoff by memory, the checklist is read, and each item is confirmed to be set for takeoff.
For the flaps to not be properly positioned for takeoff means the crew not only did not position the flaps by memory, but they simply did not do the checklist.
Fourth, there is a warning system to alert the crew if takeoff is initiated and the flaps are not in the proper position. The system did not work. There is a history here that you may find of interest.
The first flap position warning system on jetliners was simply a microswitch which was switched to the "on" position when the throttles where moved forward to the position that produces takeoff power. This was a very simple system. It is just like when you move the brake pedal forward when using the brakes in your car; the tail lights go on. When the throttle is moved forward, the switch is turned on to send an electrical system to other switches which confirm the flaps are in the takeoff position. If the flaps are not in the takeoff position, an alarm goes off.
This system was simple and seemingly reliable. Also, it could easily be tested. Before starting the engines, with the flaps not extended, the pilots simply moved the throttles forward. The alarm went off proving the warning system to be working.
But there was a problem. A 707 cargo plane was talking off from an airport in Alaska. This was, of course, years ago when 707s were fairly new. The pilots elected to delay extending the wing flaps during taxi out due to snow falling. Then, when cleared for takeoff, they forgot about the flaps and tried to takeoff. The warning system did not work. Why? Because extremely cold Alaskan weather had made the air dense enough that the engines reached takeoff power with considerably less throttle movement. The switch did not get activated.
As is always the case in aviation, when there is an accident, there is a fix for the problem. The fix was to trigger the flap warning system - not by the throttles - but by the thrust gauge. This, being an instrument, required some complex wiring and computer systems. So far so good.
On Boeing aircraft, the new system could not be tested before each flight by the pilots. Instead, it was tested periodically by maintenance.
On Douglas planes, the system could be checked before every flight by the pilots. Fast forward to the 1987 crash in Detroit. The more sophisticated Douglas system warned about a number of things, and sometimes produced nuisance warnings. According to Captain Steve (who you may know from the message board or
the chat), it is believed that the pilots deactivated the
warning system due to nuisance warnings. They forgot to set the flaps for takeoff, and the system which would have picked up their failure gave them no warning.
The ironic thing is, the fix for the accident in Alaska - a more sophisticated system subject to nuisance false warnings - led to the accident in Detroit.
As a result of the Detroit accident with the Douglas plane, Boeing redesigned its system to allow the crew to check the warning system prior to every flight.
But we now learn, if the information is reliable, that it was Spainair's policy to check the warning system at the beginning of the day. Once it checked OK, it did not need, they thought, to be rechecked.
But look at the flaw in this reasoning. The warning system was, we assume, checked by the crew. They took the plane out to the runway for takeoff, but did not takeoff due to an air temperature probe overheat warning. The temperature probe, which is exposed to very low temperatures during flight, is heated to prevent icing. An electrical relay is supposed to keep probe heat off on the ground and turn probe heat on when the plane leaves the runway. The overheat warning suggests that the relay was malfunctioning. This particular temperature probe is a "nice to have" item, and is not required for flight. Thus, mechanics disconnected electrical power to the relay. It is possible that while doing this work, power to the flap warning system was disconnected. Or, it is possible that the warning system just picked that time to develop a problem.
Any way you figure it, the warning system needed to be checked before every flight, not just at the beginning of the day, and certainly after any maintenance. Why that was Spainair's policy, I don't know; that was not the policy at the airlines I worked for.
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"Mentalization" At Work
I've written from time to time about "mentalization", the ability to note ones own internal processes. Mentalization is essential to determine whether what we have in mind is reality or imaginary. If this term is new to you, please go to the SOAR Library and read all the articles on mentalization and psychic equivalence.
This is of great importance because fear and anxiety when flying is always about the struggle to keep imagination from becoming experienced as reality. When the ability to mentalize fails, if what is imagined becomes experienced as real, great suffering due to anxiety can result.
In some cases, early development is faulty enough that the individual gains no ability to mentalize.
Individuals who cannot mentalize are typically unable to deal with ambiguity and unable to deal with any inner conflict. Their inability to deal -- within -- with conflict leads them to regard all emotional difficulties as caused by others. This, of course, leads to conflict with others. Inability to mentalize leads to difficulty delaying gratification and inability to bear any psychological discomfort. They are likely to engage in unwise, if not dangerous, behavior by attempting to get rid of every discomfort instantly.
When they have panic, they are not aware of the internal processes involved, but - again - see the cause as external. For these individuals, learning to mentalize - even a bit - can make a huge difference in their ability to function.
In other cases, early relationships have allowed some ability to mentalize to be developed. This tentative ability to mentalize, however, is not robust enough to be maintained when emotion runs high.
In still other cases, early development has been excellent, allowing mentalization to be maintained even when emotion is high. This brings to mind an essay by Kipling which starts, "If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs . . ." and ends with, ". . . you'll be a Man my son!"
Mentalization involves an awareness of the representational nature of perception, and the abstract nature of thinking.
Why is perception representational? It is because the data received by the mind from outside the person has to be translated. The eye is very much like a camera. The lens focuses light (from objects in the environment) onto the retina in the rear of the eye. The image in the rear of the eye is upside down. It is also reversed right to left, and left to right. Further, what you and I see is not seen IN the eye, but in the brain AFTER the brain turns the image back right side up, and reverses the left to right and right to left reversal. And still, all that is perceived in the mind is a representation of electrical signals produced by the retina by light bouncing off objects in the environment. This means what you or I experience is a representation - hopefully a replica - of what is in the environment.
But thought is different. Though what you see is derived from the environment, what you think is derived from what has been derived; thus, an abstraction. One way to describe the difference between perception and thought is to think of it as the difference between a photograph of a person and a painting by Picasso. Clearly, a Picasso involves abstraction.
The thinking of a person who is anxious or fearful is not like a photograph derived from the environment at the current moment; it is like a Picasso which is derived from memory of past experiences which are abstracted by fear to create a distorted expectation of an upcoming moment.
The anxious person, whose mentalization has paused, experiences the distorted expectation of an upcoming moment - not as the Picasso which it is - but as a photograph which represents reality.
When viewing a certain situation, such as being up high on a balcony, the mind creates a representation of the balcony and the ground below. If, on the balcony, you become afraid, if your ability to mentalize is tentative, your mind shifts from seeing photographically and from experiencing the present to seeing Picasso-graphically and experiencing the next moment (obviously an abstraction, and obviously distorted) as reality.
In this psychic equivalence, the abstract and distorted becomes the person's reality.
On the other hand, a person who can maintain mentalization can continue to recognize the representational nature of thought. The person can recognize, for example, that words represent - but are not - things such as people, objects, and actions. The person can appreciate that images in the mind represent - but are not - things such as people, objects, and actions. Though this seems obvious, for many people, awareness of the representational nature of thinking can be lost, allowing psychic equivalence to take place.
For example, some who inquire about the SOAR Program say they can't even look up in the sky because they might see a plane and panic. This is due to failure to recognize that the image of the plane in the mind is representational, that there is distance between the person and the plane which makes the plane no threat to the person.
On the other hand, by maintaining awareness of the representational nature of thinking, we keep a certain protective emotional distance. Auditorily, emotional distance is provided by a distinction between a word and what the word represents, such as the name of a person, versus the actual person himself or herself. Visually, emotional distance is provided by the distinction between representational images - such as mental thumbnails or icons - from the person, thing, or action the images points to.
With the strengthening exercise, we are able to automatically control emotion so that your ability to mentalize holds up when flying, allowing you to recognize that imagination if just that, and nothing more.
Here is an email that shows how maintaining the ability (via preparation through practice of the Strengthening Exercise) to mentalize pays off. The person was able, even though there was emotion present, to recognize that the emotion came from concern about her mother - not from concern about her flight.
Good morning, Tom! In case this little story has any clinical interest for you, let me tell you about my recent travel back East. It was classic!
On our way out - I was traveling with my husband - we got hung up in Dallas. Two planes we were supposed to be on were "taken out of service." American had to find us other planes and the departure time kept advancing by 25-minute increments, with gate changes for us, as they thought they had the problem solved (and didn't). We were supposed to leave at 6:45 PM for a just-before-midnight arrival at Logan.
So here is the set up: we've been delayed three or four times, which means that 1. I am now officially fatigued, with lowered resilience; 2. classic superstitious thinking is invoked ("we've been delayed repeatedly, therefore this flight could be doomed."), 3. I actually HEARD that kind of conversation being had in the seat in front of me from a couple with a baby; and 4. I forgot my meds.
To top it all off, I was on my way to see my ninety year-old mother who had a heart attack about five weeks previously. So all the ingredients were there - plus a little summer turbulence - that comprised my original fear-of-flying trauma.
So there I am, at 39,000 feet or whatever, in a dark plane, seated over the wing. My husband zonked out since we'd both been up since 6 AM that day. Add in four or five frantic and fruitless searches for the alprazolam I forgot to pack, some bumpy air and a crying baby, and THEN, a total cascade of all my anxiety over my mother's health. I just sat there and cried quietly.
But the excellent thing - and the point of this interminable note - is that I was able to tease out the transportation from the trauma WHILE IT WAS HAPPENING!
I actually was aware, in the midst of my over-the-top emotional state that I was worried about my mother. I was over-tired, that there was some bumpy air, but I was on a public conveyance. There was no relationship between my situation on the flight and the way I was feeling. It was about my mother. As I cried, I just let go, and was really conscious of getting that stuff out of my body with my tears. As my former therapist, I thought you would be proud, Tom!
After visiting with my Mom (who is doing so well she is back at home, on her own, and even volunteering again at the hospital gift shop once or twice a week) we flew to San Juan, then back to San Diego through Dallas wedged in between Hurricanes Hanna and Gustav. Yet, I didn't have even one more "moment" during the rest of the flights.
American ran on-time. We had a great, chatty pilot (love those chatty ones) from San Juan to Dallas, who flew us in a more southerly route to avoid the edges of the hurricanes, and it was a really smooth trip.
So that's my story and I'm sticking to it, Tom! It just keeps on getting better. My apparently endless thanks to you and your program for all the healing from fear.
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Call Now To Understand Why SOAR Will Work For You
SOAR was established in 1982 because no programs existed that could help people with moderate to severe difficulties. Even today, no other program offers help that is effective except for mild difficulties. No matter how difficult flying is for you, we can help.
- Call me at 877 332-7359 between 10 AM and 6 PM Eastern time or
- Set up a time online at http://soar.genbook.com
- No Charge. No Obligation. Just get the information you want.
- The full length SOAR Video Course on 11 DVDs provides the maximum help possible.
- More info.
- Accelerated courses give you the most help possible in the time you have available.
- A twenty-minute private session and unlimited group counseling sessions are included.
- What you pay is 100% transferable to the SOAR Video Course 11 DVDs.
Flying tomorrow or the day after? Be ready to fly in 90 minutes with Rapid Relief!
Flying in three to ten days? Get comprehensive help with SOAR Complete Relief.
Start viewing on your computer screen in two minutes.
- Get a compact version of the SOAR Course.
- Load it on your laptop, iPod or other media player. More info.
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Unsure Which To Choose
If you are unsure which is best for you, please call me at 877 332-7359 so we can talk it over. You will feel better as soon as you decide to act.
We are always here to help. As you go through the program, call or email whenever you have a question or a concern.
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Follow Up On The Liquid Explosive Hoax
I just want to point out that, when the liquid bomb scare hit, Patrick and I pointed out that this was a hoax perpetrated by the current administration to scare people. I pointed out that the timing had to do with the Democratic primary (August 10, 2006) in Connecticut in which war-hawk Joseph Lieberman was defeated by Ned Lamont.
On the following day (August 11, 2006) it was announced that terrorists were in the "final stages" of a plot to blow up as many as 10 jets leaving Britain for the U.S.
Twenty-some people were arrested in Britain at the behest of the U.S. The British had constant surveillance of these people and knew they were in no way close to producing a workable bomb. The Brits had planned to continue surveillance (they even had a video camera installed in the place where experiments with materials were being carried out). Arrests were grossly premature. But, the U.S. forced Britain's (by having one of the plotters arrested in Pakistan) hand. Once the arrest was made in Pakistan, the British had no option other than to arrest all those they had been monitoring lest they vanish upon hearing of the arrest in Pakistan.
As a result of the U.S. forcing premature arrest, only four of the plotters finally went to trial. One was acquitted of all charges, and the other three - because of insufficient evidence - were not found guilty of trying to blow up airliners!
Amazing! And yet, if you saw Dateline this week on NBC, you would have certainly believed these people were just days away from carrying out the destruction of several airliners.
This points out two things:
1. the media can simply not be trusted to tell the truth about the government
2. the government can simply not be trusted
I find this alarming because democracy depends upon accurate reporting. I find this despicable because it exploits and victimizes people who are anxious or fearful of flying.
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Seattle Washington SOAR-Fest Saturday October 4th
Kathie Nunes has organized this event which will be held starting at 6:00 PM at the Doubleetree Guest Suites in Southcenter, 16500 Southcenter Parkway, Seattle, Washington.
Price Per Person: $46.00 ( Includes Tax and Tip).
Meal Includes Soup or Northwest Salad, Coffee, Tea and Pop.
Entrees: Roasted Garlic Chicken
Beef Tender Loin Medallions
Grilled Chicken Cobb Salad
Kentucky Onion Rib Eye Steak
Dessert: Classic New York Style Cheesecake
Chocolate Peanutbutter Pie
Chocolate Truffle
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRICE OF THE MEAL BUT ARE AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE IN THE ATRIUM BAR.
Please click here to make your reservation.
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New York SOAR-Fest October 4th
- at La Petite Auberge, 116 Lexington Avenue (at 28th Street), New York, NY.
- Dinner is at 7:00 PM. If you like, meet in the bar at or after 5:30 PM.
You don't need to have taken the SOAR Course. This is open to anyone interested in flying problems. It is an opportunity to meet and share experiences with people who feel like you do.
The restaurant, which serves classic French cuisine, has received excellent reviews since it opened in 1977.
The Menu
Appetizers
Onion Soup
Avocado Vinaigrette
Melon en Saison
Pate du chef
Leeks Vinaigrette
Entrees
Le Filet de Sole Meuniere
Sole Filet, Butter & Lemon
Le Poulet du Chef
Chicken of the Day
L'Escalope de Veau Chasseur
Veal Scaloppini, White Wine & Mushrooms
Deserts
La Mousse au Chocolat
La Creme Caramel
Les Cremes Glacees
Peche Melba
Cheese Cake
Wine and coffee included
Onion Soup
Avocado Vinaigrette
Melon en Saison
Pate du chef
Leeks Vinaigrette
Entrees
Le Filet de Sole Meuniere
Sole Filet, Butter & Lemon
Le Poulet du Chef
Chicken of the Day
L'Escalope de Veau Chasseur
Veal Scaloppini, White Wine & Mushrooms
Deserts
La Mousse au Chocolat
La Creme Caramel
Les Cremes Glacees
Peche Melba
Cheese Cake
Wine and coffee included
The dinner, including wine, coffee, and service is $65.00. Please click here to make your reservation.
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Discuss Or Schedule An Individual Session -- Call 877 332-7359
Call between 11 AM and 6 PM Eastern Time (same time zone as New York)
You'll reach me easily. The toll free number rings my cell phone.
- find out how I can help you with flying
- discuss the possibility of a counseling session
- set up a time that fits your schedule
Outside the U.S. and Canada call 203 258-4803
- a twenty-minute session is $60.00 if not enrolled in a course.
- one twenty-minute session is free if enrolled in any course.
- additional twenty-minute sessions are $60.00.
- two one-hour sessions are included in the SOAR Guaranteed Program
Schedule An Individual Session Online
Note: Times Listed Are Eastern Time (same as New York)
